

The 2022 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief

The 2022 Arab Opinion Index is the eighth in a series of public opinion surveys across the Arab world, based on the findings from face-to-face interviews conducted with 33300 individual respondents in 14 Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania. The Arab Opinion Index remains the largest public opinion survey carried out in the Arab world. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples. The overall samples guarantee probability-proportional-to-size (PPS), ensuring fairness in the representation of various population segments.

More than 72,000 hours of work was needed to carry out these surveys by a team of 920 individuals, equally balanced in gender. The team covered a total of 890,000 kilometers across the population clusters sampled.

The results of the index are presented according to the countries surveyed and according to the general average of each Arab region. For the purposes of comparison, the data of the countries surveyed is classified according to the geographical regions of the Arab world, namely:


The Arab Maghreb - Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia

The Nile Valley - Egypt and Sudan

The Arab Mashreq - Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq

The Gulf - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar

The number of respondents to the AOI since its launch



Section 1: Living Conditions of Arab Citizens

How do Arab citizens assess their economic conditions?

- A slight majority of 52% of citizens believe that their countries are headed in the wrong direction, compared to 42% who say they are headed in the right direction.
- Those who reported that things were headed in the wrong direction gave many reasons for this. While 40% attributed this to economic reasons, 14% stated that the reason is the unstable political conditions, such as political confusion and the failure of the political system to function as it should, 9% stated that the reason is poor state management and policy, and 7% indicated a lack of stability.
- Meanwhile, of the respondents who answered that that their countries are headed in the right direction, 83% provided reasons: 19% stated that the conditions in the country had improved, 15% noted the security and safety in their countries, 13% attributed their answer to good governance, 7% to an improvement in the economic situation, 5% to political stability, and another 5% to a sense of optimism about the future.
- Only 25% of respondents, mostly in the Gulf region, reported that their household income was sufficient for them to make savings after their necessary expenditures were covered. A further 42% reported that while their household incomes were sufficient to cover necessary subsistence expenditures, they could not save. A full 28% of respondents reported that they lived “in a state of need,” with household incomes not covering their necessary expenditures. As expected, the most affluent households were concentrated in the gulf Region, while families in greatest need were concentrated in the Mashreq.
- Of those respondents whose households live “in need,” 33% resort to borrowing from a variety of sources, including 16% from family and friends and 13% from banks and financial institutions to cover their essential expenditures.
- 18% of needy families rely on institutional aid, whether from charitable, governmental, religious or civil associations, while 10% resort to selling their properties. This means that the frameworks of traditional social solidarity are still stronger than the framework of institutional aid.

Figure 1: Respondents' assessment of how things are heading in their countries




Figure 2: Longitudinal comparison of self-reported household income sufficiency






Figure 3: Regional comparison of self-reported household income sufficiency



How do Arab citizens assess the political and security situations in their countries?


- 61% of respondents believe that rated security in their country positively, compared to 38% who rated it negatively.
- The assessment of the level of safety in the respondents' countries in the 2022 poll, is 8 points less than what was recorded in the 2020 poll.
- While 44% described the economic situation of their countries as good, 54% evaluated the economic situation of their countries as negative overall. The majority of respondents in Arab countries, with the exception of the Gulf countries, evaluated the economic situation in their countries negatively, especially in the countries of the Arab Mashreq.

Figure 4: Respondent assessments of the economic situation in their countries



- 44% of respondents evaluate the political situation in their countries as positive, compared to 49% who evaluate it as negative. Most respondents in the Gulf states evaluated the political situation as positive.
- Respondents' evaluation of the political situation in their countries in 2022 was 4% less positive than that of 2020.

Figure 5: Longitudinal comparison of respondent assessments of the political situation in their countries



What are the priorities of Arab citizens?

- 16% of the respondents mentioned priorities related to government performance and policies, such as weak public services, financial and administrative corruption, governance and its policies, and democratic transition, which are problems that fall within the framework of governance policies and institutions in Arab countries.
- The priorities of the citizens of the Arab region are varied, but the largest bloc (60%) said that their priorities are economic in nature. More than half of the citizens mentioned that unemployment, high prices, poor economic conditions, and poverty are the most important challenges facing their country.
- The most important problem facing the people of the region is the problem of high prices and the high cost of living, and the AOI recorded the highest proportion of respondents citing this as their main concern since the Index began.
- 12% of the respondents said that their priorities relate to security, safety and political stability.

Figure 6: Longitudinal comparison of public opinion regarding the most important problem facing respondents' countries

Most serious problem	2022	/2019 2020	/2017 2018	2016	2015	2014	/2012 2013	2011
Price inflation and cost of living	21.0	14	10	9	9	11	12	8
Negative economic conditions	18.2	20	14	11	8	9	11	8
Unemployment	14.9	17	15	18	14	13	16	13
Poverty and living under the poverty line	6.0	7	8	7	6	7	6	8
Weakened social services	4.5	5	12	9	9	6	5	2
Administrative and fiscal corruption	4.5	8	6	5	3	4	5	10
Social Issues	3.9	4	3	6	4	3	4	3
Lack of security and safety (inc. threat of terrorism)	3.6	2	6	11	19	20	11	11
Lack of political stability	3.5	3	4	4	5	6	10	7
Poor health services	2.6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Foreign threats/interference	1.6	2	1	1	2	1	2	2
Government and its policies	1.7	2	2	4	3	2	2	3
The Israeli occupation	1.5	2	5	3	4	3	--	2
Refugees	1.6	2	1	3	3	2	--	--
Regional / sectarian / ethnic / tribal divisions	1.0	1	2	2	4	4	3	4
Democratic transition	0.5	0.5	1	2	1	1	2	2
Traffic congestion / traffic accidents	0.7	0.3	--	--	--	--	--	--
Covid-19	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--
Palestinian divisions	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	3
Other	0.1	1.0	1.0	0.1	0.4	1.0	1.0	5.3
Do not know/ Declined to answer	2.2	3	5	3	2	3	4	4
There isn't any	6.6	5	4	2	4	5	6	5
Aggregate	100.0	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

- **28% of the citizens of the Arab region want to emigrate**, and the majority of them want to do so in order to improve their economic situation. However, about 16% of the respondents who wanted to emigrate said that their motive is education or continuing education, and 11% said that they want to emigrate for political or security reasons.
- More than a third of respondents in the Mashreq, Maghreb and Nile Valley countries want to emigrate, compared to 6% in the Gulf countries.

Figure 7: Longitudinal comparison of desire to emigrate





Figure 8: Regional comparison of the desire to emigrate



- Respondents' attitudes varied regarding the countries posing the greatest threat to their countries; 28% of the public believe that Israel is the most threatening to the security of their countries, while 13% point to the United States of America as the source of the threat, and 9% Iran. Almost half of Iraqis believe that Iran is the main threat to the security of their country.
- The largest bloc seeing Israel as the biggest threat to their respective countries is in Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, and Algeria.
- While 46% of the respondents in the Mashreq countries said that Israel is the main threat to their countries, 29% of the Nile Valley region respondents stated that Israel is the biggest threat. For threats facing the Arab region, Israel occupied the first place as a threat to the Arab region in the eyes of the respondents from all countries.

Figure 9: Public opinion on countries most threatening to respondents' home countries

	Israel	US	Iran	Arab countries	France	Turkey	Russia	Ethiopia	European states	Other states	African states	Neighboring or regional Arab states	Non-Arab neighboring or regional states	Armed semi-state groups	Other	Don't know/refuse to answer	There is no source of threat	Total
Palestine	79	12	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	100
Lebanon	53	14	19	5	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	2	100
Algeria	44	4	0	0	42	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	1	100
Jordan	44	18	9	3	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	15	100
Egypt	32	9	4	11	1	9	5	20	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	100
Sudan	27	22	3	19	0	0	2	11	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	11	4	100
Mauritania	25	10	0	6	6	0	1	0	0	1	6	0	0	1	0	5	39	100
Kuwait	24	25	22	1	0	2	6	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	10	8	100
Tunisia	9	10	0	13	15	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	1	100
Iraq	7	24	44	3	0	15	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	100
Libya	7	22	0	14	4	20	3	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	3	23	1	100
Morocco	6	2	3	22	1	1	2	0	4	6	1	1	0	3	0	25	23	100
Saudi Arabia	3	3	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	21	51	100
Qatar	25	2	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	48	100
Aggregate	28	13	9	8	5	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	12	13	100

Figure 10: Regional comparison of public opinion regarding the most threatening countries


	The Levant/ Mashreq	Nile Valley	The Maghreb	The Gulf	Aggregate
Israel	46	29	19	17	28
United States of America	17	15	10	10	13
Iran	18	4	1	14	9
Arab countries	4	15	11	1	8
France	0	0	13	0	5
Turkey	4	4	5	1	4
Russia	1	3	1	2	2
Ethiopia	0	15	0	0	2
European countries	1	1	1	0	1
Other countries	0	1	1	0	1
African countries	0	0	1	0	1
Neighboring or regional Arab countries or in the region	0	0	1	1	1
Non-Arab neighboring or regional states	0	0	0	0	0
Armed semi-state groups	0	0	1	0	0
Other	0	0	1	0	0
Don't know/refuse to answer	5	8	21	17	12
There is no source of threat	4	5	13	37	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Section 2: Perceptions of State Institutions and Governmental Effectiveness

Citizen Confidence in State Institutions


- Confidence of Arab citizens in state institutions in their countries varies: while confidence is especially high especially for the military and public security institutions, confidence in judicial, executive, and legislative branches is low. Parliaments/legislative councils received the least amount of confidence. Public confidence in municipal councils and private sector companies was divided.

Figure 11: The extent of citizen confidence in the institutions of their countries



- Public opinion is divided over its confidence in the legislative councils/parliaments in the Arab countries; However, more than half of the respondents believe that these councils fulfill their role of monitoring the government, while 34% believe that they do not.
- Mashreq respondents agree least that legislative council does its role, while 55% of Maghrebi respondents think that they do fulfil their role

Figure 12: Regional comparison of respondent evaluations of their parliaments/legislative councils' performance in their duty to monitor governments



How does public opinion evaluate government performance?

- Evaluation of governments' performance at the level of foreign policies, economic policies, and a range of public policies and services, is generally not positive.
- There is a clear consensus among the Arab public that financial and administrative corruption is varied across their countries: 87% of the Arab public believes that corruption is widespread in their home countries, compared to only 10% who believe that corruption is not widespread at all. Data also indicates, over the course of eight years (since 2011), that citizen perceptions of the extent of corruption in their countries have not changed substantially. Respondents in the Mashreq countries are most certain of the spread of corruption in their countries, while the highest rates of citizens that do not believe that corruption is widespread were recorded in the Gulf countries.

Figure 131: Longitudinal comparison of public opinion on the prevalence of financial and administrative corruption in the respondents' countries






Figure 14: Regional comparison of public opinion on the prevalence of financial and administrative corruption



- 34% of the respondents said that their countries apply the law equally among citizens, while 39% think that they apply the law equally in general but favor some groups, that is, discriminate according to their interest, and 24% think that they do not apply the law equally at all.
- More than other regions, respondents from the Mashreq expressed that their state institutions do not apply the law equally among people, while the state was considered to apply the law equally by respondents in the Gulf region.

Figure 152: Longitudinal comparison of public opinion regarding the extent to which the state applies the law equally




Section 3: Arab Public Opinion and Democracy

How Does Arab Public Opinion Understand Democracy?

- Most citizens of the Arab region can provide a definition of democracy; 85% of respondents provided a definition with content.
- 34% of the citizens of the Arab region define democracy as a guarantee of political and civil freedoms. 20% of them said that democracy is a guarantee of equality and justice among citizens, 14% focused on participation and the institutional aspect of a democratic system (circulation of power, separation and control between the authorities), 6% defined democracy as a guarantee of security and stability, and 5% defined it as improving economic conditions.
- The results show an increase in the percentage of those who defined democracy as participation and the institution of democratic governance (circulation, separation, and oversight between authorities), especially in countries such as Egypt, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, and Sudan.
- The majority of the citizens of the Arab region reject negative statements about democracy, but they are divided on the statement that our society is unprepared for democracy. It is also somewhat divided towards the statement “Democracies are characterized by indecisiveness and discord.”

Figure 16: To what extent do you agree with the following statements about democracy?



- A majority of public opinion supports the democratic system, at a rate of 72%, compared to 19% against.
- Despite the close rates of support for democracy throughout the Arab region, support was highest in the Levant/Mashreq and Maghreb regions.

Figure 3: Longitudinal comparison of public perception of the statement “The democratic system, despite its shortcomings, is better than other systems”






Figure 4: Regional comparison of public perception of the statement “The democratic system, despite its shortcomings, is better than other systems”



The majority of respondents (71% consensus) believes that democracy is the most suitable system of governance for their home countries, when asked to compare democracy to other systems (such as authoritarian regimes, representative democracies where electoral competition is limited to either Islamist or non-Islamist/secular political parties, or to theocracies).

Figure 5: Public opinion on the suitability of a set of political systems as systems of government for their countries



53% of the respondents in the Arab region would **accept the arrival of a political party with whom they do not agree to power through the ballot box**, compared to 40% who said that they would not accept that. The highest rates of acceptance were recorded in the Nile Valley region and the Maghreb and the lowest in the Gulf region.

Figure 6: Longitudinal comparison of response to the question: Would you accept a political party with whom you disagree taking power in a free and fair election?





Figure 7: Regional comparison of the response to the question: Would you accept a political party¹ with whom you disagree taking power in a free and fair election?




¹ Kuwait was asked about political blocs

How Do Arabs Evaluate Democracy in Their Countries?


- This consensus on support for democracy is accompanied by a generally negative evaluation of existing democracy in the Arab World. Respondents placed the level of democracy in the region at 5.3/10 – that is, democracy remains, as far as they are concerned, only halfway there. It is lower than what was recorded in the 2020 survey.

Figure 8: Assessing the level of democracy in countries surveyed by AOI over the years



- The evaluation of the level of democracy, through the criterion of the ability of citizens to criticize the government without fear, indicates **that the ability of citizens to criticize their government is limited with an aggregate rate of 5.8 points out of 10.**
- Respondents' ability to criticize the governments of their countries was the highest in Lebanon, Iraq and Morocco and the lowest in Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Egypt.
- The ability to criticize governments is the highest in Mashreq and the lowest in Gulf countries.

Figure 24: Regional comparison of respondent evaluations of the level of democracy in the countries surveyed and the ability of citizens to criticize the government



Arab Revolutions

How Does Public Opinion Perceive the 2011 Arab Uprisings?

- In the context of identifying public attitudes toward democracy, we also gauge public opinion on the Arab uprisings of 2011, for which the main demand was to end autocratic regimes. Thus, to assess the views of citizens on the revolutions in the moment they happened, without asking about subsequent developments, we asked: “Back in 2011, several Arab countries witnessed revolutions and popular protests, in which people took to the streets in demonstrations. What is your assessment of that?”
- Results show that 46% still consider the uprisings to have been positive, and 39% consider them to have been negative. The percentage of those who evaluated it positively in 2022 is 12% points less than those who evaluated it positively in 2020/2019.

Figure 25: Longitudinal comparison of public assessment of the popular revolutions and protests that took place back in 2011





Figure 269: Regional comparison of the public assessment of the popular revolutions and protests that took place back in 2011



Aside from their evaluation of the revolutions and their outcomes, respondents were asked about the reasons that prompted people in 2011 to participate in the Arab revolutions and protest movements, and they stated that their motives were to stand against corruption (25%), as a result of the bad economic conditions (16%) and against dictatorship (14%).

Figure 2710: Longitudinal comparison of the most and second most important reasons for the Arab revolutions that occurred in 2011

Order of responses	First most important reason				Second most important reason			
	2022	2019 2020/	2018/ 2017	2016	2022	2019 2020/	2018/ 2017	2016
Against corruption	25	31	21	25	14	14	11	6
Due to poor economic conditions	16	16	20	18	14	17	17	14
Against dictatorship	14	16	14	20	12	11	9	9
For political freedoms	6	6	8	10	8	7	8	7
To end oppression	7	6	8	5	10	12	14	15
For justice and equality	5	4	5	3	9	10	12	11
For democracy	4	3	4	4	7	8	8	9
For dignity	4	4	4	4	8	8	9	9
External plot	1	-	-	-	0	-	-	-
Other	1	1	3	3	0	1	1	1
don't know, decline to respond	17	13	13	7	0	0	0	0
No other choice	0	0	0	0	18	12	13	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

- Arab public opinion was split between optimism and pessimism about the reality and future of the Arab Spring revolutions, with 40% saying that the Arab spring is facing obstacles but that will eventually achieve its goals, and 39% stating their belief that the Arab Spring has come to an end and that the old regimes are returning to power.

Figure 28: Longitudinal comparison of responses to the question: Which of the following two statements are closest to your point of view?





Figure 29: Regional comparison of responses to the question: Which of the following two statements are closest to your point of view?



Section 4: Civic and Political Participation

- Arab public opinion is divided in terms of interest in national political affairs. It is worth noting that there is a decrease of 8% in public interest in political affairs in the 2022 poll compared to the 2020 poll.

Figure 3011: Longitudinal comparison of the extent of political interest/apathy





Figure 3112: Regional comparison of the extent of political interest/apathy




What Are the Main Sources of Political News for Arab Citizens?

- Over the past eight surveys, the results have revealed fundamental shifts in the sources Arab citizens rely on to obtain political news. While reliance on the internet has increased, dependence on television has decreased.
- The majority of citizens in the Arab region still depend on television to follow political news at a rate of 47%, then on the Internet at a rate of 36%, and radio came in third place at a rate of 6%, and daily newspapers at a rate of 4%. Of course, the resources available on the Internet include news websites and platforms for media and television organizations; That is, the shift here is in the media used to obtain the news, not the type of media institution that publishes the news.


- 36% of the respondents said that they depend on the Internet to follow political news, which is the highest percentage since 2011, and it has doubled during that period more than seven times, and in contrast to this increase, the percentage of dependence on television has gradually decreased over the years.

Figure 32: Longitudinal comparison of most used media for following political news




- Membership of, and participation in, civil and voluntary organizations remain extremely limited across the Arab region, with no more than 13% of respondents reporting that they are members of such groups in any given country. When taking into account the level of active participation in the activities of such groups, the level of effective participation would likely fall further still.
- Affiliation to family associations and organizations is still higher than affiliation to civil, civil, cultural and voluntary associations.

Figure 3313: Types of political participation



- Additionally, a majority of respondents (64%) have no affiliation with a political party in any way, nor do they feel that their views are represented by any existing political group or bloc.

Figure 3414: Representativeness of Political Parties



- Although most Arab citizens support democracy, their political and civil participation remains limited. And to clarify this point, the AOI tested indicators to measure the degree of political involvement, namely: the extent of citizens' interest in political affairs in their countries, the extent of citizens' confidence in political parties, and intention to participate in the next elections.
- The majority (51%) of respondents stated their intention to vote in the next parliamentary elections, compared to 48% in 2020. The highest percentage that expressed its desire to participate in the elections was recorded in the index in 2011.
- Trust in political parties is limited and has been declining over the years.
- Although Arab public opinion favors democracy, political apathy is clearly prevalent. This may be expected in the context of limited political participation and given that available opportunities to participate in or influence the political system are not convincing to Arab citizens.

Figure 35: Do you intend to vote in the next parliamentary elections?




Figure 3615: Longitudinal comparison of levels of trust in political parties.





Figure 37: Regional comparison of levels of trust in political parties.



Section 5: Internet and Social Media

Just 22% of respondents reported that they do not use the internet, compared to 77% who said that they use the internet to varying extents. Internet use has increased in the 2022 and 2020 surveys are compared with previous years – a statistically significant increase.

Figure 38: Frequency of internet use: internet use has increased considerably since the Arab Opinion Index began.





Figure 39: Regional comparison of frequency of internet use



- Internet users rely on mobile devices to access the internet.
- 98% of internet users reported that they have accounts on social media applications and platforms.
- 86% of Internet users have a Facebook account, while 81% have a WhatsApp account.
- 47% of Internet users have an account on Instagram, 37% have an account on Snapchat, and 34% have an account on Twitter.

The majority of respondents with social media accounts in all regions of the region have accounts on Facebook, while less than half have accounts on Twitter, besides the Gulf, where 77% of internet users have Twitter accounts.

Figure 40: Social media users: frequency of various social media platforms




Figure 41: Social media users: frequency of various social media platforms by region




Figure 42: For which of the following reasons do use social media?

Order of reasons reasons	Most important reason	Second most important reason	Third most important reason	Average
In order to communicate with friends and acquaintances	58	14	6	36
In order to be up to date with trends	8	14	10	10
in order to fill free time	8	11	5	10
in order to follow the news	7	12	15	9
In order to follow content I am interested in	5	11	13	8
In order to meet new people	5	10	13	7
To share with friends what I do in my day	3	6	10	5
To work or develop my career	2	2	4	2
In order to share my political and social views	1	2	3	2
Other	0	0	0	0
Don't know/ Decline to answer	3	0	23	1
No other reason	0	18	0	10
Total	100	100	100	100

- Social media users are most likely to follow social topics, followed by political topics.
- 43% of social media users said that they trust the information and news circulated on social media, against to 57% who do not trust it. This indicates a decrease in trust in information and news circulated on social media compared to the last AOI survey. Trust in social media varies according to account.
- 48% of social media users trust the information and news published on the pages of television news outlets.
- 44% trust the information published by the social media pages of media professionals, whereas 46% do not trust it
- Social media users reported the least trust in news and information circulated on social media pages of influencers and celebrities.
- Social media users were asked several questions to determine the extent to which they use it to obtain news and political information; expressing their opinions on political events; and interacting with political issues.
- 75% of social media users obtain news and political information via social media, and 43% use it more than once a day.
- 51% of social media users express their views on political events via social media, with 22% using it for this purpose daily or several times a day.
- 48% of social media users interact with or participate in political issues, against 48% who don't.
- Nationally, Jordan used social media to interact with political issues the least. This was reflected in the Levant region, a pattern generally reflected in the Mashreq.

Figure 43: The extent of social media usage to interact with political issues




Figure 44: Regional comparison of the extent of social media usage to interact with political issues




Figure 45: Trust of social media users in the news and information circulated on social media




Figure 46: Regional comparison of trust of social media users in the news and information circulated on social media





Figure 47: Comparison between the levels of trust reported by social media users in the news and information circulated on social media in 2019/2020 and 2022



About half of the respondents in three societies, namely Kuwait (48%), Egypt (43%), and Mauritania (43%), expressed trust in the news and information published by the public pages of social media users, compared to a majority of the respondents of the other eleven countries who expressed their lack of trust in this information and news.

Figure 48: Reported trust of social media users in various types of social media accounts

	Jordan	Tunisia	Algeria	Saudi Arabia	Sudan	Iraq	Palestine	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Egypt	Morocco	Mauritania	Qatar	Aggregate
News broadcasters' pages	43.0	38.3	36.3	63.0	48.0	36.7	48.6	52.4	39.5	40.2	59.5	51.3	55.6	62.8	48.2
Media professionals' pages	31.2	36.0	34.9	47.4	45.2	35.5	50.8	53.6	36.5	42.1	54.0	49.1	48.2	55.9	44.3
News groups on WhatsApp	26.6	20.7	24.3	35.0	38.2	25.7	39.9	47.7	36.4	36.3	42.7	36.4	47.3	40.0	35.5
Public pages of social media users	26.4	26.4	35.2	26.8	39.3	31.5	34.0	48.4	29.3	35.0	43.3	37.0	43.1	35.4	35.1
Facebook newsgroups	24.2	29.8	32.0	31.2	39.7	26.1	33.2	39.2	31.5	38.1	39.8	32.3	42.7	36.1	34.0
Pages of influencers and celebrities	18.9	21.8	20.5	24.7	36.4	29.4	27.6	43.3	25.3	39.2	47.2	38.5	44.5	39.5	32.6

Social Media Influencers

- Social media users follow influencers in various fields, most often in the field of sports, followed by politics, social issues, beauty, and health.
- Following influencers does not translate into trust in what they post or influence on personal opinions. As 45% of social media users who follow influencers reported that they are influenced by what these influencers publish, compared to 55% who do not trust them.
- 52% reported that they trust the information these influencers publish, compared to 48% who expressed a lack of trust.
- 14% reported that they follow influencers continuously, on the other hand 27% reported that they sometimes follow them.

Figure 49: Do you follow influencers on social media?




Figure 50: Types of influencer followed by social media users in order of followship

	Most followed	Second most followed	third most followed	Aggregate
Sports influencers	21	8	6	15
Political influencers	17	10	4	14
Social influencers	11	11	13	12
Beauty influencers	16	6	5	11
Health/medical influencers	8	12	8	11
Culinary influencers	9	11	6	7
Religious influencers	6	7	9	7
Physical training influencers	3	6	6	5
Technology influencers	3	4	8	4
Educational influencers	2.5	5	11	4
Other	1	2	1	1
Declined to answer	2	0	0	1
No further type of influencer	0	18	23	8
Aggregate	100	100	100	100

Do Arab societies trust social media influencers?

Figure 51: The extent to which respondents trust the information published by the influencers they follow





Figure 52: The extent to which social media users report that they are influenced by the posts of influencers they follow



Section 6: Religion and Religiosity in the Public Sphere and Political Life

- Based on self-reporting, Arab citizens are divided into three blocs, the largest of which (61%) said they are somewhat religious, compared to 24% of the respondents who said they are very religious, and 12% who said they are not religious. Longitudinal changes in self-defined levels of religiosity have been minor.

Figure 53: Longitudinal comparison of self-defined religiosity





Figure 5416: Regional comparison of self-defined religiosity



Attributes that define religiosity

- When asked to define the attributes that define religiosity, most respondents provided answers that focused on an individual's morality and values rather than the observance of religious practices (57%). This value has not changed significantly since the AOI began.

Figure 5517: Longitudinal comparison of factors most cited to define an individual as religious






Figure 5618: Regional comparison of factors most cited to define an individual as religious



- Most respondents oppose the statement that a non religious person is a bad person
- While most Arabs describe themselves as religious to some extent, most respondents nonetheless oppose edicts which pass negative judgement against members of other faiths, or which declare followers of differing interpretations of Islam to be apostates.

Figure 58: Longitudinal comparison of the perception of statement: “No one is entitled to declare followers of other religions infidels”



- The majority (59%) of respondents expressed that they do not deal with people on the basis of their religiosity or lack thereof, while 31% said that they prefer dealing with religious people, and 9% prefer to deal with non-religious people.

Figure 59: Longitudinal comparison of the perception of the statement: “In your day-to-day life, do you prefer to deal with religious individuals?”





Figure 60: Regional comparison of the perception of statement: “In your day-to-day life, do you prefer to deal with religious individuals?”



To what extent do citizens agree to the use of religion in politics?

- Most Arabs oppose the involvement of clerics in voter choice or in governmental policy. Similarly, a majority of Arabs are opposed to the employment of religion either by governments in order to win support for their policies, or by electoral candidates to win votes.

Figure 6119: Perception of statement: “The government has no right to use religion to win support for its policies.”





Figure 62: Regional comparison of perception of the statement: “The government has no right to use religion to win support for its policies”



- Arab public opinion is split almost in half on the principle of “separation of religion from state,” with (47%) supporting the principle of separation of religion from political life and 48% opposing it.

Figure 63 : Perception of statement: “It would be better for my home country if religion was separated from politics.”





Figure 64: Regional comparison of the perception of the statement: "It would be better for my home country if religion was separated from politics."



Section 7: Arab Public Opinion and Intra-Arab Relations

- A total of 80% of the respondents to the 2022 Arab Opinion Index supported the sentiment that the various Arab peoples formed a single nation, in contrast to only 17% who agreed with the statement that “the Arab peoples are distinct nations, tied together by only tenuous links.” Figure 65: Respondents generally agree that the various Arab peoples constitute a single nation.





Figure 66: Regional comparison of assessments of Arab national unity



Which state poses the greatest threat to the Arab world's security?

- 59% of Arab public opinion considers that Israel and the United States combine as the two countries that most threaten the security of the Arab world, while Iran comes in third place with 7%. This demonstrates that Arab public opinion acknowledges that it is possible to talk about security for the Arab world and to identify the countries that pose the greatest threat to the security of the Arab world.


Figure 6720: States that pose the greatest threat to the Arab Countries

	2022	202/2019 0	2018/2017	2016	2015	2014	2013/2012	2011
Israel	38	37	39	41	45	42	52	51
United States	21	29	28	27	22	24	21	22
Iran	7	12	10	10	10	9	6	4
Arab Countries	5	5	7	5	5	5	3	2
Russia	3	1	2	3	1	--	--	--
European Countries	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	--
Other countries	2	1	1	1	1	1	0.3	1
Others	0	1	0	1	1	0.1	--	0.2
No threats	15	2	4	1	1	1	1	0.4
DK/ Declined to answer	7	11	8	9	12	17	15	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Threats to the Stability and Security of the Region

- Respondents were asked about the extent to which the policies of some forces threaten the security and stability of the region. The results demonstrate public consensus (84%) that Israel's policies threaten the security and stability of the Arab region. Also, 78% of the public agrees that US policies threaten the security and stability of the region. 39% said that Turkey's policies represent a source of threat to the security and stability of the Arab region, compared to 54% who said the opposite.
- 37% of Arab public opinion believes that China's policies threaten the security and stability of the region.
- 57% of the respondents expressed their belief that Iranian policies threaten the security and stability of the region, while this percentage was 57% with regard to Russian policies, and 53% with regard to French policies. It is thus clear that Israel is considered the greatest threat to the region

Figure 68: Do you think that the policies of some international regional powers threaten the security and stability of the region?



How do Arab Citizens View the Palestinian Cause?

- Over three quarters of the Arab public agree that the Palestinian cause concerns all Arabs, and not the Palestinians alone. Respondents from Jordan, Algeria, and Mauritania recorded the highest agreement with this sentiment.

Figure 69: Attitudes towards the Palestinian cause by year




Figure 70: Attitudes towards the Palestinian cause by country





Figure 71: Regional comparison of attitudes on the Palestinian cause



Do Arabs Accept Their Countries' Recognition of Israel?

- An overwhelming majority (84%) of Arabs disapprove of recognition of Israel by their home countries, with only 8% accepting formal diplomatic recognition. In fact, one half of those who accepted formal diplomatic relations with Israel and their governments made such a move conditional on the formation of an independent Palestinian state. When asked to elaborate on the reasons for their positions, respondents who were opposed to diplomatic ties between their countries and Israel focused on several factors, such as Israeli racism towards the Palestinians and its colonialist, expansionist policies.
- Despite all the normalization agreements concluded with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, the percentage of those who agreed to recognition in Israel increased by two percentage points in the 2022 index compared to the results of the 2020 index.
- The highest rate of refusal to recognize Israel was among respondents in Algeria and Mauritania at 99% each, followed by those in Libya at 96%, Palestine at 95%, Jordan at 94%, Iraq 92%, and Tunisia at 90%.
- Refusal to recognize Israel is the highest in the Mashreq region, followed by the Arab Maghreb. More than two-thirds of the respondents in Morocco and Sudan expressed their refusal to recognize Israel, while support for recognition 20% or less, with a notable chunk of respondents declining to answer or expressing a lack of response. It should also be noted that 57% of the Saudis

did not express their opinion on the question, while 38% rejected the recognition of Israel compared to 5% who supported it.

Figure 72: Would you support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel by your country?




Figure 73: Longitudinal comparison of responses to the question: Would you support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel?





Figure 74: Regional comparison of responses to the question: Would you support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel?



- Respondents who opposed diplomatic ties of Israel justified their positions with several reasons, relating mainly to Israel's colonialist nature, racist and expansionist policies, and persistence in appropriating Palestinian land. The reasons cited by the respondents clearly indicate the position on recognizing Israel is unlikely to change as long as this colonial nature exists.

Figure 75: Reasons for opposing diplomatic recognition of Israel over time
Reasons given for opposing diplomatic recognition of Israel since 2014 (as a percentage of respondents)

	2022	2019/2020	2017 2018/	2016	2015	2014
Colonialist occupying power in Palestine	36.6	33.7	31.7	27.0	24.5	23.4
Expansionist state set on controlling more Arab territory	9.0	9.4	10.1	13.0	13.0	2.4
A terrorist state/supports terrorism	7.0	7.6	7.4	7.6	10.4	1.2
Israeli dispossession of the Palestinians; continued oppression of the Palestinians	6.5	6.8	8.3	8.1	6.9	5.5
Religious reasons to oppose Israel	5.1	6.7	6.6	5.2	3.3	4.9
(Israel) is racist towards Arabs	5.2	5.9	6.3	8.2	10.3	12.2
Recognizing Israel negates the Palestinian people	3.6	4.8	5.3	5.8	5.6	7.5
Israel is an enemy of my people/the Arabs in general	3.7	4.1	3.4	3.3	4.7	11.5
Israel threatens regional security	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.4	2.5
Israel violates agreements and treaties	1.8	1.6	1.6	2.1	2.4	2.3
Israel does not exist	-	2.3	1.1	0.6	0.3	3.4
Other	0.2	-	-	-	-	-
No reasons given	2.5	1.9	1.6	1.8	0.6	10.2
Total of those opposed to recognizing Israel	84.3	88.2	86.8	85.9	85.4	87.0
Approve of the recognition of Israel	7.5	6.2	7.9	9.5	8.9	6.0
Do not know/declined to answer (as a percentage of respondents)	7.9	5.6	5	5	6	7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

How Do Arabs Evaluate the Policies of International and Regional Powers in Palestine?

- Public opinion on Turkish policy in Palestine was divided between those who see it as positive by 43% and those who see it as negative by 41%.
- The Arab Gulf region evaluated Turkey's policy in Palestine most positively.

Figure 76: Regional comparison of evaluations of Turkish policy on Palestine





Figure 77: Longitudinal comparison of evaluations of Turkish policy in Palestine



- A vast majority (77%) of Arab respondents evaluated US policy on Palestine negatively, compared to only 11% who evaluated it positively.
- There is a strong Palestinian consensus (92%) that US policy in Palestine is bad.
- While most regions negatively assess US policy in Palestine, the Mashreq provides the most negative assessment.

Figure 78: Regional comparison of evaluation of US policy in Palestine





Figure 79: Longitudinal comparison of evaluations of US policy in Palestine



- Evaluations of Iranian foreign policy towards Palestine were mostly negative at 52%, compared to 31% who evaluated it positively.
- Palestinian public opinion was divided over the evaluation of Iranian policy in Palestine, between 42% who evaluated it positively and 41% who evaluated it negatively.
- The respondents of the Nile Valley region gave the most negative evaluation of Iranian policies towards Palestine.

Figure 80: Regional comparison of evaluations of Iranian policy in Palestine





Figure 81: Longitudinal comparison of evaluations of Iranian policy in Palestine



- Evaluation of the Russian policy in Palestine is also characterized by negativity, as more than half of Arab public opinion (58%) sees Russian policy in Palestine as negative, compared to 23% who see it as positive.
- The majority of Palestinians believe that the Russian policy in Palestine is negative.
- The Arab Maghreb recorded the most negative evaluation of Russian policy in Palestine.

Figure 82: Regional comparison of evaluations of Russian policy in Palestine





Figure 83: Longitudinal comparison of evaluations of Russian policy in Palestine



- French policy in Palestine was generally regarded negatively, with 61% considering French policy in Palestine as negative, compared to 21% who rated it positively.
- The majority of Palestinians believe that the French policy in Palestine is negative.
- The Arab Maghreb recorded the most negative evaluation of French policy in Palestine.

Figure 84: Regional comparison of evaluations of French policy in Palestine





Figure 85: Longitudinal comparison of evaluations of French policy in Palestine



How do Arab citizens view the Russian/Ukrainian war?

- On average, 44% of Arab public opinion agreed that Russia's declaration of war on Ukraine was unjustified, compared to 19% who said it was justified, while 37% said they do not know or declined to answer.
- The majority of Kuwaiti, Qatari, Egyptian, Iraqi, Tunisian and Jordanian public opinion considers this war to be unjustified.

Figure 86: To what extent is the Russian invasion of Ukraine justified/unjustified?

