



المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات
Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies

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Arab Opinion Index 2024-25

Press Release

Arab Center Announces Results of Arab Opinion Index

The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha announced today the results of the Arab Opinion Index (AOI) 2025. The survey was conducted in 15 Arab countries: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar, in addition to Syria, where the Arab Center carried out its first survey of this kind since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime. The AOI aims to identify trends in Arab public opinion on a range of political, economic, and social issues, and has been conducted regularly by the Arab Center since 2011.

The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with a sample of 40,130 respondents representative of their respective countries, with a margin of error of $\pm 2-3\%$ across all countries. It was conducted between October 2024 and August 2025. This ninth edition of the AOI constitutes the largest public opinion survey ever undertaken in the Arab region, in terms of sample size, scope of topics, and number of countries covered. A total of 1,000 researchers participated in its implementation, which required more than 413,000 hours of work, more than one million kilometres travelled by field researchers. The continuity of this large-scale survey, together with the diversity of its themes, has made the AOI a critical data source for Arab and international research institutions, scholars, and experts.

The results are presented both according to surveyed country and the overall regional average for the Arab world. For comparative purposes, the data from the surveyed countries is classified by the geographical regions of the Arab world as follows:

- The Maghreb: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.
- The Nile Valley: Egypt and Sudan.
- The Mashreq: Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria.
- The Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar.


I: Living Conditions

The results reveal a general sense of optimism among Arab citizens about the direction their countries are heading; Overall, 57% of respondents said things in their countries are headed in the right direction, while 37% felt they are headed in the wrong direction. Those who said things are going in the wrong direction cited several reasons: 40% attributed it to economic factors, 14% cited poor and unstable political conditions, such as political turmoil and the failure of the political system, 9% cited poor state management and policy, and 7% pointed to a general lack of stability.

Meanwhile, of the respondents who answered that that their countries are headed in the right direction, 83% provided reasons: 19% stated that the conditions in the country had improved, 15% noted the security and safety in their countries, 13% attributed their answer to good governance, 7% to an improvement in the economic situation, 5% to political stability, and another 5% to a sense of optimism about the future.


Fifty-five percent of respondents reported that the political situation in their countries was generally good (very good/good), compared to 38% who reported it was bad (bad/very bad). Eighty-six percent of respondents in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries rated the political situation as good, compared to a lower rating in other parts of the region, particularly in the Mashreq, where the figure was 37%.

Figure 1. Regional comparison of respondent's assessments of political situation in their countries



The AOI results reveal far from satisfactory economic conditions for Arab citizens; 41% reported that their family income covers only their basic needs, leaving no room for savings, while 28% stated that their families live in poverty, as their income does not cover their basic needs. The majority of these families in need rely on aid and loans to meet their needs. With the exception of respondents from the Gulf countries, the majority of citizens in Arab countries live hand to mouth or unable to meet basic needs.

Figure 2. Regional comparison of self-reported household income sufficiency



II: State Institutions and Governmental Performance

The results indicate that the confidence of Arab citizens in state institutions in their countries varies; while confidence is high for the military, public security, and judicial institutions, confidence in executive and legislative branches is low. Parliaments/legislative councils received the least amount of confidence (51%). Assessments of government performance in foreign policy, economic policy, and a range of public policies and services are largely divided, broadly corresponding to public opinion evaluations of government performance in previous surveys. Public opinion is almost unanimous that financial and administrative corruption is widespread in their countries, with 84% reporting that it is prevalent to varying degrees, while just 11% stated that it is not prevalent at all. Data from nine surveys (since 2011) shows that citizens' perceptions regarding the extent of corruption in their countries have not changed substantially. Respondents in the Mashreq countries are most convinced of the spread of

corruption in their countries, whereas the respondents least likely to consider corruption as prevalent were recorded in the Gulf countries. Regarding equality in the eyes of the law, 40% of respondents said that their country enforces the law equally among citizens, while 39% think that it favours certain groups (i.e. discriminates according to their interest), and 18% think that the state does not apply the law equally at all. More respondents from the Mashreq than from other regions expressed that their state institutions do not enforce the law equally among people.

Figure 3. Citizen confidence in principal state institutions (general average)




Figure 4. Longitudinal comparison of public opinion on the prevalence of financial and administrative corruption in respondents' countries




Figure 5. Longitudinal comparison of respondent assessments of the extent to which the state enforces the law equally




Figure 6. Regardless of the extent to which you agree or disagree with current government policies, which of the following statements best expresses your perspective on the state in your country?






Figure 7. Which of the following statements best expresses your perspective on the government in your country?



III: Arab Public Opinion and Democracy

The index results showed that 83% of citizens in the Arab region could provide a definition of democracy that focused on guaranteeing political and civil liberties, the peaceful transfer of power, the separation of powers, and ensuring justice and equality. Public opinion is almost unanimous in support of democracy; 68% of respondents expressed their support for the democratic system, compared to 20% who opposed it.


Figure 8. Longitudinal comparison of respondents' agreement with the statement "Democracy, despite its shortcomings, is better than other systems"



Sixty-seven percent of respondents indicated that a pluralistic democratic system is the most suitable political system for their country. Meanwhile, between 52% and 69% agreed that

systems such as authoritarianism, military rule, rule by Islamist parties only, a Sharia based system without elections or political parties, or one limited to secular parties are unsuitable for their countries. Comparing the results of this survey with previous surveys shows that public opinion remains firmly in favour of democracy.


Figure 9. Respondent perspectives on the suitability of certain political systems for their countries



Respondents rated the level of democracy in their respective countries at 6.2 out of 10 (on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is undemocratic and 10 is highly democratic), compared to 5.3 in 2023; this suggests that, in their view, democracy in the Arab world is still only halfway there. In assessing the level of democracy by evaluating citizens' ability to criticize their governments on a scale of 1 to 10, the score drops lower still; with an average rating of 5.3 out of 10.

Although Arab public opinion prefers democracy to other systems, political apathy or disengagement is clearly prevalent, with only 6% reporting membership in political parties, 11% in voluntary associations, and nearly half expressing their unwillingness to participate in elections. This may be expected given the limited scope of political participation, and perhaps the available avenues for participation are deemed ineffective by the average citizen.

Figure 10. Longitudinal comparison of respondent assessments of the level of democracy in their countries (arithmetic mean)



IV: Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, and Syria

In keeping with now established tradition, the AOI continued developing questions tailored to current affairs. In this context, it allocated a set of special questions to countries undergoing transitions or facing crises and conflicts.

A look at public opinion among Palestinians in Gaza

In a field survey conducted in Gaza in March 2025, 93% of respondents reported being displaced from their homes once or more during the war. 48% of respondents indicated they were living in a house (either complete or damaged), while 24% said they were living in tents, and 13% in a public building, such as a hospital, school, etc. Electricity, internet access, and medicine were available to only 11-36% of respondents, meaning 64-89% of respondents lacked these essential services. 90% of respondents indicated they had needed medicine or medical supplies for themselves or a family member during the war but had not been able to find them. 85% reported that they or a family member had experienced hunger multiple times during the war, while 81% said that they or a family member had been unable to find drinking water on several occasions. 46-57% of respondents indicated that they witnessed multiple instances of people begging for food or water.

Figure 11. Percentage of Palestinians Gaza forcibly displaced since the start of the war




Table 1. Where Gaza Residents Are Living

Type of Accommodation	%
House (complete or damaged)	48
Tent	24
Public Building/School/Institution/ Business	13
Abandoned or unfinished building	6
Garage/warehouse/depot	6
In the street/public spaces	2
Workplace	1
Total	100

Figure 12. Percentage of Gaza respondents indicating that certain basic needs were available most of the time, sometimes, or rarely




Figure 13. The experiences of Gaza respondents or their families in obtaining basic needs during the war





Figure 14. Respondents in the Gaza Strip reporting seeing people forced to beg for food or water during the war



A Look at Lebanese Public Opinion

In the survey conducted in Lebanon in March 2025, 10% of respondents in Lebanon reported that a family member had left Lebanon as a result of the war. 76% of respondents from areas targeted by Israel (southern Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut, etc.) stated that they had been forced to flee during the conflict. 88% said they felt that the area to which they had fled was welcoming. At least half of respondents from the war affected regions expressed a lack of access to basic foodstuffs and 41% expressed a lack of access to healthcare, medicine.

Figure 15. Did any of your family members leave Lebanon as a result of the war? (%)




Figure 16. Percentage of Lebanese forcibly displaced during the war




Figure 17. While you were displaced, to what extent did you feel that the district where you were living welcomed you? (%)





Figure 18. Lebanese respondents who reported that various services were available to them most of the time, sometimes, or rarely



A look at Sudanese public opinion on the war

In a survey was conducted inside Sudan in November 2024, 47% of respondents reported being displaced, either individually or with some or all of their families, since the outbreak of the conflict. Of course, this percentage excludes those who fled the country entirely. 34% of those displaced indicated they had been able to return to their homes, while 66% reported not having returned as of the time of the survey. Of the latter, 38% stated they were staying in extended family homes or with relatives, 31% said they were renting other accommodation, 15% were residing in shelters, and 11% were staying with acquaintances. Regarding the availability of certain necessities, 58% of respondents indicated that potable water was available, while 45% indicated a lack of access to electricity and 58% a lack of access to food supplies. 71% reported that they were unable to obtain necessary medications, while 72% indicated that they did not have access to healthcare when needed.

Of the 34% of Sudanese respondents reported their property had been stolen, 89% attributed the theft to the RSF. A further 23% said their home had been raided and 18% said their homes had been occupied. 17% of Sudanese respondents said they or a member of their family had been attacked, compared to 82% who said they had not. Meanwhile, 9% had been detained, 4% had faced sexual assault. All the respondents who had been subjected to these crimes were able to identify the perpetrator.

Figure 19. Forced displacement since the outbreak of the war in Sudan




Figure 20. Displaced Sudanese who have returned home compared to those who remain displaced




Figure 21. Where are displaced Sudanese living now?




Figure 22. Percentage of Sudanese respondents reporting that various services were available most of the time, sometimes, or rarely (arithmetic mean %)




Table 2. Percentage of Sudanese respondents saying they or a family member had been a victim of specific crimes since the start of the war, and the perpetrator.

	Have you or members of your family experienced...?			Who was the perpetrator?			
	Yes	No	Declined to answer	RSF	Army	Other	Declined to answer
Theft of Property	34	66	0	89	2	7	2
House Raid	23	77	0	95	1	0	4
Occupation of House	18	81	1	97	1	0	2
Attack by factions in battle	17	82	1	94	3	0	3
Arrest	9	90	1	82	16	0	2
Sexual assault	4	95	1	86	5	0	9

A look at Syrian public opinion

The survey conducted from 25 July to 17 August 2025, following the fall of the Assad Regime, revealed that between 80% and 94% of Syrian respondents expressed feelings of hope, joy, happiness, and relief at the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, while around 80% expressed feelings of anxiety or uncertainty.

Regarding general conditions in their country, Syrians reported that the most pressing problems facing their country are related to the economic situation, security, political stability, and national unity. 36% of respondents reported that their families rely on remittances from abroad, whether regular or irregular. Only 1% of Syrians eat meat daily, while 16% reported eating it a maximum of three times a week. 89% reported eating it once a month.

Public opinion regarding a range of basic services in Syria was largely negative. 54% of respondents rated the availability of food as "good," while less than a third said the same about the availability of healthcare, internet, water, and electricity.

Figure 23. Measuring sentiment among Syrian respondents since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime




Figure 24. Distribution of Syrian respondents according to whether their families receive monthly remittances from abroad




Figure 25. Frequency of consumption of various meat/fish products (per week)





Figure 26. Proportion of Syrian respondents ranking specific services as “good”



Regarding Syrian public opinion on the political situation, the majority of respondents support the establishment of political parties in the country, including Syrian national political movements and Islamist movements. The largest group of respondents supported the presence of Arab nationalist and liberal civil movements. More than half of respondents rated the government's performance as "good" with regard to guaranteeing freedom of expression, respecting human rights, and preserving territorial integrity. However, the majority expressed a negative assessment of the government's performance on combatting discrimination among citizens, guaranteeing political pluralism, and disbanding armed groups. 65% of respondents support holding accountable anyone involved in human rights violations, even those who belong to the opposition to the Assad regime. Regarding the type of state Syrians want, 42% support a civil state, compared to 28% who support a religious state.

Figure 27. Percentage of Syrians rating government performance on certain principles as "good"




Figure 28. Syrians' views on who should be held accountable for the sake of transitional justice (%)





Figure 29. Syrian preferences for the form of the Syrian state (%)



In the context of societal, cultural, and ethnic diversity, 64% of respondents believe that over the years, the Syrian people have succeeded, to varying degrees, in integrating into a single united family, while 12% said that no such integration has occurred at all. 19% of respondents believe that the most important factor shaping Syrian national identity is “shared Syrian culture,” followed by the following factors: the Arabic language (17%), living on Syrian territory (10%), social and cultural diversity (9%), and Islam (8%). 70% of respondents reported that “sectarian rhetoric” is widespread in the country, and 84% believed that people in Syria today categorize themselves and others based on sect and religion.

While 66% of respondents believe that discrimination between people based on their sects and religions is widespread in the country, 57% believe that discrimination based on regional origin is widespread. 41% of respondents believe that tension between citizens based on sect or religion is the result of foreign interference, while 36% believe it is a result of an absence of citizenship and tolerance. Although Syrians acknowledged the existence of sectarian discourse, 66% of respondents said that they do not differentiate in dealing with others, regardless of their sect or religion. 25% expressed a preference to deal with people of the same sect. A majority of 66-78% said they would not mind if their neighbours were of other religions, sects and ethnicities; this reflects a rejection of discrimination.

Figure 30. Syrians’ evaluations of the country’s success in integrating into a single, united unit (%)






Figure 31. How Syrian respondents see the prevalence of sectarian discourse and discrimination in the country today



In the context of the Israeli occupation, 70% of respondents oppose an agreement with Israel that does not include the return of the Syrian Golan Heights, and 74% believe that Israel “is working to support certain groups in Syrian society in order to fuel separatist conflicts and threaten the unity of Syrian territory.” Meanwhile, 88% believe that Israel “is working to threaten security and stability in Syria.”


Figure 32. Do Syrians support an agreement with Israel that does not include the return of the Syrian Golan Heights?



V: Arab Public Opinion and Intra-Arab Relations and Palestine


Regarding perceptions about the Arab nation, 76% of respondents agreed with the sentiment that the region's inhabitants formed a single nation, despite distinct characteristics, while 17% believe they represent different nations and peoples tied together by only tenuous links.

Figure 33. Longitudinal comparison of responses to statements on Arab nationhood among the Arab peoples



Arab public opinion is largely united on the existence of a shared “Arab national security” and can identify sources of threats to this security. There is a consensus that both Israel (44%) and the United States (21%) represent the greatest threats to the security of the Arab region. The results showed that public opinion is almost unanimous, at 84%, that Israeli policies threaten the region's security and stability. Similarly, 77% agree that US policies threaten the region's security and stability, while 53% agree with Iranian policies, 48% with Russian policies, and 47% with French policies. This clearly demonstrates that public opinion views Israel as the most significant threat to the region's stability and security.


Figure 34. Do the policies of these states threaten the security and stability of the Arab region?



At a time when analysts frequently discuss the Arab world's disengagement from the Palestine question, the results clearly indicate that Arab societies still consider it a collective Arab cause, with 80% of respondents agreeing that "the Palestinian cause is a collective Arab cause, not solely Palestinian".

Regarding the policies of some international and regional powers toward Palestine, the majority viewed South Africa's policies positively, while expressing disapproval of the policies of other countries. Most of the public views the policies of the United States, Russia, Iran, France, Britain, and Germany negatively. Spanish policy was the most positively received among Western and European countries, with 43% expressing a positive view and 35% a negative one.

Figure 35. Evaluating the policies of regional and international powers towards Palestine



Regarding Israel, 87% of Arab citizens oppose recognition, while only 6% support it. Those who oppose recognition cited a number of reasons, most of which are related to Israel's colonial, racist, and expansionist nature. The results show opposition to the recognition of Israel is not based on cultural or religious stances. It is worth noting that public opinion across the Arab region is virtually unanimous in its rejection of recognition of Israel.

Fig 36. Longitudinal comparison of Arab opinion on their countries recognizing Israel




Table 3. Reasons cited for opposition to recognizing Israel in AOI polls since 2014 (% of total)

Reason cited for opposition	Year of Survey	25-2024	/2022 23	2019 2020/	/2017 2018	2016	2015	2014
Because Israel is a settler-colonial state occupying Palestine		31.5	36.6	33.7	31.7	27.0	24.5	23.4
Because Israel treats Arabs with racism and hatred		5.0	5.2	5.9	6.3	8.2	10.3	12.2
Because of Israel's enmity towards my people and to Arabs in general		2.7	3.7	4.1	3.4	3.3	4.7	11.5
Because recognition would be a denial of the Palestinians and their rights, and would legitimize what has been done to the Palestinian people		6.0	3.6	4.8	5.3	5.8	5.6	7.5
Because Israel has exiled the Palestinians and continues to oppress and kill them		9.1	6.5	6.8	8.3	8.1	6.9	5.5
For religious reasons		2.3	5.1	6.7	6.6	5.2	3.3	4.9
Because Israel threatens and undermines regional security and stability		3.0	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.4	2.5
Because Israel is an expansionist state seeking to dominate or occupy countries in the Arab world and control their resources		13.3	9.0	9.4	10.1	13.0	13.0	2.4
Because Israel does not respect agreements or treaties		1.5	1.8	1.6	1.6	2.1	2.4	2.3
Because Israel is a terrorist state that supports terrorism		6.6	7.0	7.6	7.4	7.6	10.4	1.2

Reason cited for opposition	Year of Survey	25-2024	/2022 23	2019 2020/	/2017 2018	2016	2015	2014
Because Israel has occupied more Syrian territory in recent months		0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
Because Israel occupies the Golan Heights		0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
There is no state called Israel		0.3	0.2	2.3	1.1	0.6	0.3	3.4
No reason given		5.5	2.5	1.9	1.6	1.8	0.6	10.2
Total opposed to recognizing Israel		87.1	84.3	88.2	86.8	85.9	85.4	87.0
Total agreeing to recognizing Israel		6.0	7.5	6.2	7.9	9.5	8.9	6.0
Don't know/decline to answer		6.9	7.9	5.6	5	5	6	7
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In the context of the war in Gaza and Lebanon, the results reveal that Arab citizens as a matter that directly affected them, with 87% reporting feeling psychological stress as a result. 70% of respondents reported following news about the war on Gaza, compared to 28% who did not. The majority of those following the war indicated that their primary source of information was satellite television (57%), followed by the internet (35%).

When asked which country in the world had the best stance towards Palestinians during the war, 15% of respondents in the Arab region chose South Africa, followed by Spain and Iran (7% each). 83% of citizens of the Arab region stated that South Africa's case against Israel at the International Court of Justice boosted their morale and was a step in the right direction. In this context, 70% of Arab citizens supported the idea that their governments should develop relations with South Africa. Meanwhile, 83% of citizens in the Arab region considered the recognition of Palestine by countries in Latin America and Europe to be a positive development.

Figure 37. Respondents who reported feeling psychological stress because of Israel's wars on Gaza and Lebanon





Figure 38. Evaluating the policies of regional and international powers towards Palestine



VI: Public Opinion on the United States

This year, the AOI included a set of questions to gauge public opinion trends toward the US in general, and the extent of cultural ties with it. The AOI had previously measured this 10 years ago.

Seventy three percent of respondents reported that they have some degree of knowledge about the US, while 8% said they were well-acquainted with the US. While 24% indicated that their primary source of information about the US was the media, 21% reported that their sources were internet based, specifically social media. Comparing the results of the 2025 survey with those recorded 10 years prior reveals a qualitative shift in the sources of knowledge about American culture and society: the internet and social media have become primary sources of information about the US, alongside traditional media.

Figure 39. Longitudinal comparison of how well-acquainted respondents report to be with the United States





Figure 40. Longitudinal comparison of sources from which respondents get most of their information about society/life/culture in the US



When respondents were asked about their feelings toward the US in general, 56% expressed negative feelings, a higher percentage than ten years ago. 54% of respondents said their negative view of the US was a result of its foreign policy and not a disagreement with American values or culture, compared to 24% who said their negative view was a result of disagreement with American values and culture. When asked specifically about the American people, 27% of respondents said that notwithstanding US foreign policy, they had a negative view (compared to 19% ten years ago), while about half reported that their view of the American public was either positive or neutral when foreign policy was put aside. To explore further whether negative attitudes toward the US were based on factors other than foreign policy (such as culture and values). The results showed that less than a third of respondents would choose the US for medical treatment or professional training. A quarter said they would choose American products when purchasing imported goods, and 21% said they would choose the US as a country to which to emigrate. Meanwhile, 14% said they would choose the US for a vacation. A comparison of respondents' choices in the 2025 survey against those recorded 10 years prior shows a clear decline in public opinion regarding the US versus other countries. The percentage of those who indicated it would be their top choice dropped by approximately 15 to 20 percentage points, reflecting a statistically significant shift in perceptions, which could be attributed to the critical evaluation of US foreign policy.

The results also show that public opinion has become more negative concerning American society; respondents were more negative than previously when asked about a range of positive statements, such as American society's tolerance, respect for minorities, democratic nature,

advanced arts, and appreciation of individual effort. An assessment of US policies in the Arab region in general, and towards Palestine in particular, indicates that Arab publics view these policies negatively.

Furthermore, approximately three-quarters of citizens in the region agree that US policies threaten regional stability. Between 50% and 66% see the US as attempting to impose its policies on the rest of the world, control Arab countries, exacerbate divisions among them, and favouring undemocratic governments. 55% of respondents rejected the claim that the US protects human rights. 44% of respondents agreed that a change in US policies toward Palestine (such as protecting Palestinians from Israel and halting financial and military support to the latter) would improve their view of the US.

The negative assessment of US policies in the Arab region, and toward Palestine in particular, has significantly altered public opinion toward the US more fundamentally. It has also resulted in a less positive view of American society and a decline in Arab citizens' preference for the US even in areas where it is known for being advanced, such as medicine, education, and training.

When asked how Western publics, including the American public, views Arabs, 60% said it was a negative view, while 28% said it was positive. When asked about the reasons for this negative view, 25% cited religious reasons, 20% said it was the result of organized campaigns to disparage Arabs, while 14% blamed bad or offensive actions by Arabs themselves.

Figure 41. Longitudinal comparison of how positively respondents describe their feelings toward the US




Figure 42. Country comparison of answers to: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view?”




Figure 43. Longitudinal comparison of answers to “Putting aside US foreign policy, what is your view of the American people?”




Figure 44. Longitudinal comparison of which activities respondents chose the US as the best place to undertake




Figure 45. Longitudinal comparison of the extent to which respondents consider the US as characterized by specific values (1-10)




Table 4. Respondent agreement with proposed statements about the US

	Agree / somewhat agree		Disagree / somewhat disagree		Don't know / decline to respond	
	2025/2024	2014	2025/2024	2014	2025/2024	2014
The US seeks to dominate Arab countries	66	--	20	--	14	--
The US seeks to impose its policies on the rest of the world	62	63	26	24	12	13
The US exploits its foreign aid to impose its own agenda	63	64	23	22	14	14
The US exacerbates divisions among Arab states	61	--	24	--	15	--
US policies contribute to increasing terrorism in Arab countries	58	50	26	30	16	20
The US fuels sectarianism, ethnic divisions and separatism in the Arab world	58	54	23	25	19	21
The US helps spread financial corruption in the Arab world	55	52	28	28	17	20
The US prefers dealing with undemocratic governments in the Arab world	50	--	29	--	21	--
The US protects human rights in the Arab world	31	34	55	49	14	17

Table 5. Responses to "Which of the following decisions, if it were implemented, would improve your view of the US?"

	/254202	2014
Halting material and military support for Israel	17	26
Protecting Palestinians from Israel	14	--
Bringing about a just resolution to the Palestine question	13	35
Not interfering in our country's internal affairs	10	6
Treating the Arab people with dignity and respect	9	3
Helping solve the fundamental challenges our countries face	4	2
Increasing economic aid to the region	3	4
Halting support for autocratic and undemocratic Arab regimes	3	4
Working to end the Iranian nuclear programme	3	2
Working to resolve the Syrian crisis in a way that meets the aspirations of the Syrian people	--	6
Boosting humanitarian aid to needy and crisis-hit areas of the Arab world	--	1
Reaching an agreement with Iran over its nuclear programme	--	1
My opinion of the US will not improve regardless of what it does	9	--
Don't know/decline to respond	15	10
No other answer	0	0
Total	100	100

Figure 46. Respondent answers to “In your view, do Western publics have a positive or negative view of Arabs?”





Figure 46. Respondent evaluations of why Western publics have a negative view of Arabs



VII: Social Media

Internet usage is increasing; 79% reported they use the internet in contrast to 18% of respondents who do not. Of internet users, 90% rely on mobile devices for browsing and over 98% have social media accounts, with the percentage varying by platform; 90% of internet users stated that their primary language is Arabic.

Internet users cite a variety of reasons for using social media, but the largest percentage (27%) reported using it to connect with friends and acquaintances, 15% to follow news from their country, and 11% to fill free time. 13% of social media users reported that they use it to follow news and political topics, while 14% use it to keep up with trends. 47% of users reported preferring video for browsing content on these platforms, compared to 27% who prefer written text.

Figure 48. Internet use




Figure 49. Respondents with various social media accounts out of total internet users




Figure 50. Preferences of social media users in accessing content




Table 6. Reasons for using social media

	%
To connect with friends and acquaintances	27
To keep up with local news	15
To fill free time/entertainment	11
To follow content that interests me	9
To keep up to date with trending topics	9
To follow global news	8
To share my daily activities with friends	7
To meet new people	4
For work or to promote my field	4
To share my opinions	3
To become an influencer	1
Other	0
Don't know/Decline to answer	2
No second answer	0
Total	100

Regarding opinion on social media, 41% of users reported trusting the information and news circulating on it, compared to 59% who do not. Notably, trust in information and news published on social media has declined since in the 2020 survey. Trust varies among users depending on the accounts and pages; 56% of respondents trust information and news published on official pages, while trust in other pages was less than 50%. The lowest levels of trust were found in information published by the accounts of influencers and celebrities, with less than a third of respondents trusting what they post. Given the diverse uses of social media, respondents were asked several questions to determine the extent to which they use it to obtain political news and information, express their opinions on political events, and engage with political issues.

Figure 51. Extent of social media use to obtain news and information




Figure 52. Longitudinal and regional comparison of social media user trust in the news and information circulating on it





Table 7. Arithmetic mean of social media users' trust in the news and information published on select platforms (longitudinal comparison)

	2025/2024	2023 /2022
Official government pages	55.7	--
News TV channel pages	48.0	48.2
Media/journalist pages	44.1	44.3
WhatsApp news groups	38.9	35.5
Facebook newsrooms and groups	35.4	34
Public pages for social media users	33.7	35.1
Influencer and celebrity pages	31.8	32.6

VIII: Social Media Influencers

Half of social media users follow influencer accounts: 9% of respondents said they follow influencers regularly, 28% follow them occasionally, 18% follow them rarely, while about half of social media account holders said they do not follow them at all.. Results varied from country to country; the majority in Jordan, Tunisia, and Iraq reported not following influencers, while the majority in Morocco, Kuwait, Qatar, and Mauritania reported following influencers.

Figure 53. Followship of social media influencer accounts



The results showed that social media users follow influencers across a variety of fields, with the most followed influencers focusing on social, sports, and political content. Following influencers does not necessarily translate into trust in their posts or influence over their opinions, as followers of influencer accounts were divided between those who trust the information published by influencers (52%) and those who do not (48%). Meanwhile, 55% of those who follow influencer accounts reported that they are not influenced by what is published on their pages, compared to 45% who reported being influenced by it.

Table 8. Most followed influencers, ranked in order of how much social media users follow

	Most followed	Second most followed	Third most followed
Social Influencers	15	12	10
Sports Influencers	12	6	5
Political Influencers	11	7	5
Beauty Influencers	8	7	8
Religious Influencers	9	6	4
Cooking/Nutrition Influencers	6	8	8
Educational Influencers	8	7	6
Travel Influencers	5	6	8
Health and Medical Influencers	6	6	6
Technology Influencers	6	7	6
Fitness Influencers	3	4	4
Online Shopping Influencers	3	3	3
Other	2	3	2
Decline to Answer	6	0	0
No other answer	0	18	25
Total	100	100	100

Figure 54. Who respondents believe is monitoring their social media activity




Figure 55. Are you aware that there are electronic armies on social media?




Figure 56. Since the beginning of the war on Gaza, have you decided to stop following certain influencers because of the way they react to the Palestine question?

